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SUBJECT: Written Statement of FM Lam Akol on Chad-Sudan Relations

Ref: a) Khartoum 00972, b) Khartoum 00938

¶1. Summary: On April 23, Foreign Minister Lam Akol briefed the diplomatic corps on the state of Chad-Sudan bilateral relations. The statement cites Chad as the source of tension in the relationship, and maintained that Sudan did not support rebel groups against it. It further describes the historical roots of tension in Darfur and the two states, and identifies Chad as the source of its own conflicts. Chad, it states, has failed to live up to the Tripoli agreement. Sudan thanks Libya for its role in interceding on behalf of its interests, and in trying to resolve the differences between Chad and Sudan. End summary.

¶2. During a 30-minute briefing of approximately 60 diplomats in attendance, Foreign Minister Lam Akol outlined the state of Chadian-Sudanese relations. Ref A details his verbal presentation; at the end of his remarks, the MFA distributed the below text, which provides a more detailed account of historical background and various rebels groups.

(Begin text)

Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Briefing Session of Foreign Diplomatic Heads of Mission  
Khartoum - April 23, 2006

¶1. Ever since the present regime assumed power in Chad, the Sudan government has maintained excellent relations with it based on mutual respect and good neighborly relations. We have adopted a strategy that prevented hostile Chadian opposition activities be launched from the Sudanese territories. This strategy has been enshrined in joint Agreements that contained arrangements for operations to patrol the common borders in anticipation of hostile attacks by rebel groups in both countries.

¶2. Furthermore, the government of Sudan has initiated reconciliation talks between the government of Chad and the major political and armed opposition groups in Chad, a move that cemented the stability of the regime and the region at large. This course of stability could have continued has it not been for the behavior of the government of Chad that threatened the efforts of maintaining harmonious relations. The Chadian government violated the already signed Agreements, suppressed internal opposition, liquidated its leaders, e.g., Abbas Kotti, Adama Asil, and others who were left with no option but to return to opposition camps and launch armed rebellion.

¶3. The current armed groups in Chad are targeting the

regime of Idris Deby and has no links whatsoever with the government of Sudan. The opposition activities are developing from different directions because of divisions and factionalism among army personnel equipped with weapons and machinery.

#### Background to the current situation

The present regime in Chad is widely based on tribalism. The ruling tribe has constituted a purely tribal strategy to establish the "Grand Zaghawa State" that includes the present three Darfur states of the Sudan as an integral part of the large dream state. The plan to implement this strategy started as early as the year 2000 under the leadership of the former Minister of Defense Jim Four, who died in France as a result of an injury in the battlefield. The Plan Implementation hence had been delayed until the emergence of the Fur Militias in (Jebel Marrah) in 2003, and this time Idris Debe has assumed the leadership of this movement himself.

Many of the leadership of the rebel movements are not of Sudanese nationality. The Sudan government is in possession of documents that they are citizens of Chad. Some of them are active officers in the Chadian army, to mention a few of them:

1. Mannie Arko Minawi, the founder of Darfur Liberation Movement, which then turned to be called Sudan liberation Movement.

2. Tigani Salem Jero founder of the Justice and Equality Movement is an officer in the National Guard of Chad.

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3. Ahmed Tugud, a leading figure in the Justice and Equality Movement. He was an officer in the Customs Department of Chad and now holds a British Passport. He only had his education in the Sudan.

4. Major General Jebriel Abdelkarim, leader of the "Reform and Development Front" who is till an officer in the Chadian army getting his pay until this day from the Chadian army.

5. Many more army officers of Chadian nationality are presently fighting with rebel movements in Darfur. The Sudan government has all the material evidence (i.e. photos and documents) to support this.

6. 60% of the "Justice and Equality" forces are essentially Chadian soldiers.

7. 64 soldiers of the Chadian army arrested inside the Sudan has testified to the AU interrogating offices that Chad is supporting the rebel movements in Darfur by logistics, training, and armaments.

8. The Stance of Idris Deby towards Darfur crisis was initially unclear. He started strongly supporting the mediation to resolve the crisis, then under tribal pressures turned his back to the mediation effort render to render unconditional support for the rebel movements in Darfur. At the same time he lost control of the army when many military officers failed to identify his real intentions towards Darfur crisis and his allegiance to the tribe was questioned. At this juncture he decided to render full support for the rebels of Darfur, regardless of the effects that such stand could cause against his statesmanship and the national interests of his country.

9. Last October Chadian forces in Abeche staged a mutiny, after that the Chadian authorities closed their consulate in Jenaina and ordered the Sudan Consulate in Abeche to close and the staff was evacuated to Sudan. A

request by the Sudanese authorities to go to Ndjamena to meet Chadian authorities on the matter was rejected by the Chadians. The Sudanese President tried to talk on telephone with Idris Deby and that was also refused.

¶10. The Chadian leadership failed to administer the internal plight and the confrontational attitude among the factions ad that prompted the presidency to accuse Sudan of interference to divert attention away from the internal problems of the government. The president of Chad used his argument to close our Consulate in Abbashi while the real reason for this step is to escalate his supportive campaign for the rebels in Darfur.

¶11. The Sudan has documented evidence of Chadian plans to launch offensives against Sudanese border points and they had issued licenses for importation of arms as military equipment from East Europe and Asia for arming rebel forces of Darfur.

¶12. Many regional and bilateral attempts were made to reconcile and normalize relations between Sudan and Chad the last of which was the Libyan initiative culminating in the Tripoli Agreement which laid the foundation for security and political arrangements aiming at patrolling the joint borders. Yet Chad had refused to deploy its observers at the agreed border points in clear manifestation of its reluctance for the control of the borders lest the Sudanese observers detect the Chadian logistical and material support for the rebel groups.

¶13. The government of the Sudan accepted the mediation in Darfur crisis, despite our prior knowledge of their flagrant support to the Darfur rebels. This fact was proved once more when the Chad delegation in the AU Peace and Security Council started to launch allegations against the Sudan government instead of reporting on their role as a mediator. They even rejected the idea of a common political strategy between the two countries towards their respective opposition groups, and that demonstrates their bad intensions towards the Sudan.

¶14. In another attempt to reconcile the difference between the two countries, Tripoli has invited Heads of Security Services in Sudan, Chad and Libya last March to follow-up implementation of Tripoli Agreement, and to meet with President Idris Deby in Ndjamena. All parties met in 19 March 2006 and agreed with President Deby to terminate all forms of opposition presence in both

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countries under the Libyan supervision. The opposition forces to bypass this tripartite arrangement urge their forces to speedily move towards Adry and Abeche and southward through Central Africa territories towards Ndjamena, to take the lead in the recent attack.

Official stance of the Sudan:

In continuation of Sudan strategy of transparency in the course of relations with Chad, and in our attempts to curb the present escalation against the Sudan, it has confined its action to a process of clarification of the situation in Chad and its organic relationship with the current situation in Darfur.

The Sudan will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests at bilateral, regional, and international levels. It will take all necessary precautionary measures to defend its borders against any possible attacks, in light of the hostile attitude of Chad that developed in the last few days. However, the Sudan maintains its principal stance towards the developments in Chad as follows:

¶1. The government is committed, in letter and spirit, to

the Tripoli Agreement signed between the two countries last February, including its commitment to deploy joint military observers to the agreed upon points at the common borders. We hope that Chad would send its representatives to the joint military Observers.

¶2. The government upholds its commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others and will continue to observe the good neighborly relations.

¶3. The Sudan welcomes the statement issued by the AU Peace and Security Council on 13 April 2006 on the current situation in Chad. The statement indicates that what is happening in Chad is an internal problem that should be resolved through dialogue.

¶4. The Sudan welcomes the Libyan initiative for reconciliation as expressed by the Libyan envoy Dr. Eltereiki during his recent visit to Sudan. We are ready to attend meetings of the security and political committees as envisaged by Tripoli Agreement.

¶5. The Sudan continues its determination to reach a settlement of the Darfur crisis at the on-going Abuja negotiations, hopefully before the end of April 2006.

¶6. The Sudan calls on the international community to lend full support to the on-going Peace Process in Darfur and refrain from any actions that might discourage the peace process.

¶7. We strongly condemn the occupation of the Sudan Embassy in Ndjamena, which was engineered and directed by the Chadian authorities, and the uncivilized behavior of the occupants. We take this opportunity to thank the Libyan mission in Ndjamena for their relentless efforts that facilitated the safe return of the Embassy staff to Khartoum

(End text)

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